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Abstract: This paper develops a proposal about phenomenal consciousness that is (somewhat) 
eliminativist in two respects.  First, regarded in the light of some common ways of conceiving of 
consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary".  Second, it opens up space for a development in which 
what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Let eliminativism about an object, x, or property, X, be the claim that x doesn't exist 
or X is not instantiated.  Atheists are in this sense eliminativists about all gods, 
Christians are eliminativists about Zeus.  More universally, we tend these days to be 
eliminativists about impetus, caloric and phlogiston. 
 
One may wonder how global the threat of elimination is.  Among the objects and 
properties that we take to exist or be instantiated today, which ones may be up for 
"elimination" tomorrow?  This paper focuses on the case of phenomenal 
consciousness, or "what it is like" to be in certain mental states. 
 
It is often claimed that consciousness is secure against elimination.  Flanagan, for 
example, urges that consciousness differs importantly from objects and properties that 
have been "eliminated" in the past.  Phlogiston was hypothesised to exist because it 
could explain phenomena that are more immediately present to us, like burning and 
rusting.  But consciousness is not, or not only, assumed to exist because it explains 
 2
other, more immediately observable phenomena.  Consciousness is also, and perhaps 
primarily, assumed to exist because it is itself immediately present to us.  As Flanagan 
puts it: "consciousness as a phenomenon to be explained has a secure place at the 
observational periphery" (1992, 33; cf. also Chalmers 1996, 102). 
 
It's easy to feel the force of Flanagan's suggestion.  However, I shall try to cast some 
doubt on it in what follows. 
 
Section 2 makes some preliminary remarks about "eliminativist" and "revisionist" 
outcomes of theoretical developments.  Section 3 develops the somewhat eliminativist 
proposal about phenomenal consciousness.  Section 4 elaborates on the eliminativist 
character of the proposal.  Section 5 comments on the relation between the proposal 
and "monitor theories" of consciousness. 
 
 
2. Eliminativist and revisionist conclusions 
 
Every now and then, we realise that things are not quite the way we once thought they 
were.  Nothing is quite the way Newtonians thought that mass were.  The element 
centrally involved in burning and rusting is not the way phlogiston was taken to be.  
The heat of a body is not what caloric theorists thought it was.  Royalties don't 
exercise power with a divine mandate, and solidity is not a matter of being dense all 
over. 
 
In some cases where we realise that things aren't the way we thought they were, we 
end up saying eliminativist things like, "there is no x".  In other cases, we end up 
saying revisionist things like, "x is not quite what we thought it was". 
 
What determines whether, in a given case, we end up saying one thing or the other?  
Presumably the magnitude of our change of view – however exactly that should be 
measured – plays some role.  If our views on a topic change (by some measure) to a 
significant extent, we are presumably more inclined to draw an eliminativist 
conclusion than if they revised to a lesser extent.  But it's possible that more 
"pragmatic" factors play a role as well, for example, whether researchers judge that 
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they will make a greater impact by using one or the other kind of formulation (c.f. 
Churchland 1986, 283-4; and Stich 1996, chapter 1). 
 
However that may be, it seems to me that, whether in a given case we end up talking 
in an eliminativist or a revisionist way is not as such of any interest.  What is of 
interest is our change of view, and I suggest that we can achieve at least an intuitive 
sense of how significant such a change is that is independent of how we end up 
speaking.  For example, if Lavoisier had convinced us to say things like, "phlogiston 
exists but it's not what we thought it was", I suggest that we could have achieved the 
same appreciation of the theoretical change that he contributed to bring about. 
 
I shall next develop a proposal concerning consciousness.  Whether accepting this 
proposal would lead us to make eliminativist or revisionist claims, I believe that, if 
one comes from a certain natural and commonly occupied starting point, it would 
amount to a significant change of view. 
 
 
3. A proposal about phenomenal consciousness 
 
I shall develop my proposal in three steps. 
 
Step 1: Sifting out the "Galilean qualities".  Consider a visual experience of a ripe 
lemon in good lightning condition.  Salient in this experience is a certain yellowish 
quality.  It's somewhat tricky to make this quality a joint topic of conversation, 
because there are so many disagreements about it.  For example, while naïve realists 
take it to be a property of lemons, sense-datum theorists to be a property of sense-
data, some qualia theorists may take it to be a property of conscious experiences, and 
others take it to not be instantiated at all.  There is also disagreement about how we 
talk, should talk, and can talk about this quality.  Some find it natural to use the term 
"yellow" to talk about it, but others think that we don't have a public language term 
for it, and even that we can't introduce such a term (Thau 2002, section 5.13). 
 
But despite these obstacles, I think we can make this kind of quality a joint topic of 
conversation.  Whatever instantiates it, and whatever it can and should be called, it is 
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the kind of quality that is most salient in our colour experiences.  I will suppose that 
we have a shared understanding of which type of quality this is. 
 
I will call these qualities "Galilean", since I take it to be the kind of quality that 
Galileo was concerned with when he discussed what qualities belong to the world and 
what qualities belong to the mind.  (I shall later distinguish these from alleged 
qualities of another type.)  I use "Galilean quality" broadly, for qualities that are 
salient in various sense perceptions like sight, smell and taste, and bodily sensations 
like pains and itches.  However, for brevity I shall focus on the Galilean qualities that 
are displayed in colour experiences. 
 
My first proposal in working towards a somewhat eliminativist view of phenomenal 
consciousness is that Galilean qualities are not constitutive properties of phenomenal 
consciousness.  Galilean qualities may be not instantiated at all, or they may be 
properties of objects like lemons.  In either case, they don't contribute to constitute 
what it is like to have a conscious experience.  I call this The Separation Thesis, since 
it says that consciousness and the Galilean qualities are, in a certain sense, separate.1 
 
The Separation Thesis is presumably somewhat controversial.  But it is surprisingly 
hard to say how controversial it is.  Even though it is quite central to our 
understanding of what consciousness is, few philosophers who discuss consciousness 
make clear whether they accept or reject it.  (No doubt the difficulties in talking about 
the quality, noted above, contribute to this unclarity.)  However, my impression – 
largely based on an admittedly non-scientific selection of conversations – is that few 
philosophers would deny The Separation Thesis out of hand.  Moreover, and more 
importantly, I'm inclined to think there are good reasons to accept the thesis.  Space 
does not allow an elaboration of these reasons however, and here The Separation 
Thesis will be just assumed. 
 
Step 2: Noting the elusive character of whatever is left.  Suppose The Separation 
Thesis is right.  What then is phenomenal consciousness like?  If what it's like to 
                                                 
1 In Sundström (2007) I invoke The Separation Thesis to argue that the problem is often 
mischaracterised; I also suggest that eliminativism about consciousness should be taken seriously 
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experience a ripe lemon is not in part constituted by a Galilean quality, what is it like?  
It seems that whatever is left is pretty elusive.  In fact, once the Galilean qualities are 
assumed to not be part of consciousness, one may start to wonder whether there is 
much or anything left of the phenomenon at all.  Perhaps consciousness doesn't have 
such "secure place at the observational periphery" after all? 
 
It has been suggested to me in this context that consciousness may be constituted, 
wholly or in part, by a set of non-Galilean qualities.  The suggestion is that an 
experience of a ripe lemon displays both a Galilean quality and a quality of another 
kind.  Even if the former doesn't constitute what the experience is like, the latter does. 
 
However, even if I search really hard, I fail to find in my experiences a set of qualities 
over and above the Galilean ones.  Granted, this may be because my introspection is 
deficient, or because I'm blinded by some prejudice.  However, it may also be because 
there are no extra qualities there, and that those who seem to find them are projecting 
on the basis of some prejudice.  My present case assumes that the latter view is the 
right one. 
 
Step 3: Identifying whatever is left with first-person awareness.  One might think that, 
even if steps 1 and 2 above are taken, there remains a robust and salient phenomenon 
of consciousness.  For compare your typical, familiar visual experience of a ripe 
lemon with a subliminal experience of a ripe lemon.  There is a striking difference 
between the two.  The subliminal experience goes on "in the dark" while the other one 
has a vivid phenomenology. 
 
The difference is surely salient.  However, it seems to me that it can plausibly be 
accounted for in a rather deflationary way.  The proposal is that the difference is 
simply one of first-person awareness.  In the normal case, I am aware in a peculiar 
first-personal way of my visual experience, or that I have it.  In the subliminal case, 
I'm not aware – or at least, I'm not aware in that way – of my experience or that I have 
it. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(section 5).  The present paper traces a somewhat different route from The Separation Thesis to 
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4. The eliminativist character of the proposal 
 
It is natural to think of phenomenally conscious states as somehow "shining" or 
"glowing".  From that perspective, the present proposal seems to "deflate" our 
conception of consciousness.  A tree doesn't shine any more when it is perceived than 
when it is not perceived; what comes and goes is only the relational property of being 
perceptually registered.  According to the present proposal, the difference between a 
typical, familiar perception and a subliminal perception is of just the same kind. 
 
The deflationary character of the proposal can also be brought out by contrasting it 
with certain suggestions about what "phenomenal realism" entails.  According to 
Block, for example, you are a phenomenal realist only if you accept that 
consciousness resists a priori or armchairs analyses in "non-phenomenal terms" such 
as "representation, thought or function" (Block 2002b, 392).  The present proposal 
would seem to qualify as non-realism about phenomenal consciousness, by Block's 
lights.  It says that, if there is phenomenal consciousness at all, it is nothing other than 
a kind of representation, to wit, first-personal awareness; and, while it is presumably 
advisable to take into account everything you know about the world when you assess 
the proposal, I suspect it qualifies as an "armchair analysis", by Block's standards. 
 
In addition to being deflationary, there is a further way in which the present proposal 
opens up space for an eliminativist-style development about phenomenal 
consciousness.  Our understanding of the peculiar kind of first-person awareness we 
have of certain of our states is not terribly advanced, and it is certainly a live 
possibility that we will eventually distinguish rather different types of such awareness.  
For example, it is not obvious that one and the same process is in play when I am (i) 
aware that I experience a ripe lemon, (ii) aware that I want to marry my girlfriend, and 
(iii) aware that one of my tacit beliefs is that Winston Churchill had a kneecap.  If 
consciousness is nothing other than a peculiar kind of first-personal awareness, and if 
there are several different kinds of such awareness, we may well end up judging that 
what we once thought about in terms of "consciousness" was many things. 
                                                                                                                                            
eliminativism about consciousness. 
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5. Relation to monitor theories 
 
There is a family of views according to which the phenomenal consciousness of a 
state is, at least in part, a matter of that state being "monitored" in some special way.  
On some such views, the consciousness of a state is a matter of the state being, in part, 
a representation of itself (e.g. Kriegel 2003).  On other such views, the consciousness 
of a state is a matter of it being represented by another, "higher-order" state, which 
may be either perception-like (e.g. Lycan 1996) or belief-like (e.g. Rosenthal 2002). 
 
What is the relation between the present proposal and these views?  Two remarks are 
in order. 
 
First, many or all monitor theorists take monitoring to constitute only a part of 
phenomenal consciousness.  For example, Kriegel distinguishes "two aspects" of what 
a conscious experience of blue is like: a "qualitative" aspect and a "for-me aspect" 
(2005, 23).  Monitoring is supposed to account only for the second, for-me aspect.  
The qualitative aspect gets a separate treatment.  The present proposal is different.  It 
suggests that consciousness doesn't have a qualitative aspect at all.  Whatever 
qualities are displayed in conscious experience are not constitutive properties of what 
it is like. 
 
Second, even with respect to the "for-me aspect" of consciousness, I believe the 
present proposal differs from at least some monitor theories.  At any rate, I think 
there's a difference in what the views purport to explain.  The present proposal is 
emphatically deflationary about consciousness.  Monitor theorists don't always or 
even standardly advertise their view as such, and it may not be how many or all of 
them regard the matter.  It may be noted, though, that critics often emphasise the 
deflationary character of monitor theories, and complain that the theories reduce 
consciousness to a triviality (e.g. Block 2002a, 214; and Chalmers 1996, section 4.5).  
If the present proposal is right, these critics may well be right that monitor theories are 
seriously deflationary, but wrong to suppose that this tells against them. 
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